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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case is before us on interlocutory appeal from the 
District Court's denial of defendant Darren Berry's motion 
to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Berry was charged 
with three counts of distributing cocaine base in violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). In his motion to dismiss, Berry 
argued that the federal prosecution was barred by his 
earlier plea and sentence in state court on charges arising 
from the same drug transactions as those charged in the 
federal indictment at issue here. The District Court denied 
the motion. The only issue on appeal is whether the District 





The District Court did not make specific findings of facts, 
but based its decision on the facts as construed by Berry. 
The facts favorable to Berry are essentially as follows. In 
about December of 1996, Assistant District Attorney Nancy 
Winter, who was cross-designated as a Special Assistant 
United States Attorney, spoke with Pennsylvania State 
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Trooper Carlton Watson and told him that she knew of a 
federal cooperator who had information that Watson might 
be able to use.1 Watson had previously been designated as 
a federal agent in an unrelated case but was not so 
designated for the investigation of Berry. 
 
On February 7, 1997, Berry sold crack cocaine to 
Watson, who was working undercover. Within a few days, 
Watson reported this to Winter. On two later occasions, 
Berry again sold crack to Watson. After the third sale, on 
February 21, 1997, the Pennsylvania State Police arrested 
Berry and charged him in state court. On June 24 of the 
same year, Berry pleaded guilty in state court and was 
sentenced to four to ten years in prison. 
 
A short while later, as part of an ongoing, cooperative 
program between the U.S. Attorney's office and the 
Philadelphia District Attorney's office, Berry's case was 
reviewed and selected for federal prosecution.2 Berry was 
federally indicted on July 16, 1997. Winter had coordinated 
and organized the FAST (Federal Alternatives to State 
Trials) program with federal authorities for more than six 
years and was cross-designated as a Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for that purpose. 
 
FAST involves a regular review of arrests referred for 
state court prosecution by the District Attorney's Office to 
determine whether, based on specific criteria, federal 
prosecution is appropriate. Cases selected by the state 
officials are then reviewed by supervisors at the U.S. 
Attorney's Office, who decide which cases are most 
appropriate for federal prosecution. An Assistant U.S. 
Attorney is then assigned to prosecute the matter. 
 
One of the criteria used to determine whether the case 
will be selected for federal prosecution is whether a 
defendant, based on his or her prior criminal record, is a 
career offender under U.S. Sentencing GuidelinesS 4B1.l. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Winter testified that there were no federal agents available to make 
use of the information at the time. 
 
2. We note that the Government followed the Petite policy and requested 
and received approval for the federal prosecution from the Attorney 
General. 
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The quantity of drugs involved is a second factor. Another 
general factor is whether the case is related to an ongoing 
federal investigation or previously-adopted state 
prosecution. Berry met each of these criteria, and as a 
result, his case was selected for federal prosecution. 
 
Prosecutor Winter was involved in the selection of Berry's 
case for federal prosecution, but the two prosecutors' offices 
applied the FAST criteria separately. In other words, the 
criteria were used first by the District Attorney's office to 
decide whether to present the case to federal authorities, 
and then by the U.S. Attorney's Office to decide whether to 
prosecute the case at the federal level. 
 
After being selected for federal prosecution, Berry was 
sent a "target letter" notifying him that he was under 
federal drug investigation and advising him to contact the 
Federal Defender's Office if he was unable to afford an 
attorney. Berry appeared before a Magistrate Judge who 
appointed Federal Defender Leigh Skipper to represent him. 
Skipper informed the government of Berry's desire to 
cooperate and made an initial "proffer" to the government. 
At this meeting the government informed Berry and Skipper 
that it intended to present Berry's case to the grand jury. 
Skipper requested additional time in which to provide 
assistance, and the government agreed to a short delay to 
allow Berry an opportunity to earn a downward departure 
under section 5K1.l of the sentencing guidelines. 
 
After a short delay, the federal grand jury indicted Berry 
on three counts of distributing crack cocaine. At his 
arraignment, Berry told the Pretrial Services Officer that he 
was surprised that he had been charged federally because 
he had pleaded guilty in state court to avoid federal 
prosecution. Berry stated that he had been told by the 
attorney representing him in state court that it was unlikely 
that the federal authorities would pursue his case if he 
pleaded guilty in state court. Neither the Government nor 
Attorney Skipper was aware, until after Berry's federal 
indictment, that Berry had pleaded guilty in state court. 
 
Berry had entered a negotiated guilty plea in state court 
and had been sentenced immediately. The Assistant District 
Attorney (not Winter) who negotiated Berry's guilty plea 
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with his state court defense attorney stated that Berry's 
case had been taken out of order at the request of his 
defense attorney. The Assistant District Attorney was not 




It is not disputed that Berry's prosecution by the federal 
government for the same acts that his state prosecution 
dealt with does not, standing alone, represent a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment's proscription against double 
jeopardy. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
316-17, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1082 (1978). Nonetheless, Berry 
argues that when the evidence is viewed as a whole, it is 
clear that the state prosecution was heavily influenced and 
controlled from beginning to end by federal authorities, 
and, therefore, that his federal prosecution falls within the 
narrow "Bartkus exception" to the dual sovereignty rule. 
See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124, 79 S. Ct. 676, 
678 (1959). We disagree. 
 
In Bartkus, the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility 
that dual federal and state prosecutions might run afoul of 
the general rule affirming such prosecutions if one 
authority was acting as a surrogate for the other, or if the 
state prosecution was merely "a sham and a cover for a 
federal prosecution." Id. at 123-24, 79 S. Ct. at 678. Berry 
points out that the information about him came from a 
federal cooperator, who was referred by Winter, the cross- 
designated Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, to State Trooper 
Watson, who had recently been sworn in as a federal agent. 
Winter and Watson spoke about the investigation and 
about the arrest of Berry, and, ultimately, Winter 
recommended that Berry be prosecuted federally. Berry 
argues that, under these circumstances, the most 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the state 
prosecution was so influenced and controlled by the federal 
authorities that it was merely a "sham and a cover" for the 
federal prosecution. Accordingly, Berry claims that his 
situation fits the Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty 
rule. Berry argues that the District Court erred by holding 
that the federal charge does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause and by refusing to dismiss the indictment. 
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Not so. Although we have previously recognized the 
potential existence of an exception to the dual sovereignty 
rule under Bartkus, see United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 
1345, 1351 n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 447 
(1997), we have never applied the exception to overturn a 
second state or federal prosecution.3 Even were we to apply 
the Bartkus exception to Berry's case, the facts here would 
not fit within the scope of the exception because this state 
prosecution simply cannot be considered "a sham and a 
cover" for a federal prosecution.4 
 
First, the initial investigation was conducted by State 
Trooper Watson, who was not acting as a federal agent, and 
it involved no commitment of federal resources. In Bartkus, 
federal and state officials had cooperated with each other, 
and this cooperation was sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 
See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123, 79 S. Ct. at 678. Although 
Trooper Watson had been deputized to act as a federal 
agent in another case, he was not performing this role in 
Berry's case. The fact that Watson received information 
from a federal source does not imply federal control over his 
actions. 
 
Second, Berry's case was selected for federal prosecution 
based on facts implicating valid federal interests, namely: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At least one circuit has questioned whether the Court even intended 
to create an exception in Bartkus. See United States v. Brocksmith, 991 
F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
4. Therefore, this is not the occasion for us to decide whether to apply 
the Bartkus exception. We also note that we and other Courts of Appeal 
have suggested that the growth of federal criminal law has created a 
need for the Supreme Court to reconsider the application of the dual 
sovereignty rule to situations such as this. See United States v. Grimes, 
641 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1981) (arguing that "a reexamination of [the 
dual sovereignty doctrine] may be in order" because of its questionable 
"formalistic conception" and "the recent expansion of federal criminal law 
jurisdiction"); see also United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive 
Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Grimes and noting that 
"the [Bartkus] exception's narrowness combine[d] with significant 
developments both in substantive federal criminal law and in criminal 
law enforcement [indicates] that the entire dual sovereignty doctrine is 
in 
need of serious reconsideration"). However, this is a matter for the 
Supreme Court. 
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(1) Berry's criminal history qualified him as a career 
offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, (2)  the 
amount of crack cocaine being distributed was high, and 
(3) the information regarding Berry's drug activit ies 
emanated from an individual who had been accepted for 
federal prosecution. As earlier noted, these are guideline 
criteria for the FAST program, and the ultimate 
determination as to federal prosecution was made by the 




In sum, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
held that there was no merit to Berry's argument that his 
federal prosecution requires an exception to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine because it violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. We conclude that the District Court 
properly denied Berry's motion to dismiss and we therefore 
affirm. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                7 
